研究中国经济，讲好中国故事，不仅仅是中国学者的重要工作，也越来越受到全球经济学家的重视。香港中文大学（深圳）经管学院张田余教授、汪勇祥教授参与的三篇论文高居金融学顶刊Journal of Financial Economics中国经济题材引用量前十，其中张田余教授的一篇论文引用量达2741。
Journal of Financial Economics
Journal of Financial Economics是由Elsevier出版的金融领域同行评判的学术期刊，被认为是一流的金融杂志之一。Journal of Financial Economics是三大金融学顶刊中发表中国题材论文最多的期刊，引用量也最为可观。根据谷歌学术数据统计，引用量过千的论文有五篇。
01. Law, finance, and economic growth in China
02. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms
03. China share issue privatization: the extent of its success
04. Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience
05. Institutions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms
06. Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit quality, and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China
07. China’s secondary privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform
08. Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China
09. Profiting from government stakes in a command economy: Evidence from Chinese asset sales
10. Size and value in China
● Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms
T.J. Wong 南加州大学马歇尔商学院
Almost 27% of the CEOs in a sample of 790 newly partially privatized firms in China are former or current government bureaucrats. Firms with politically connected CEOs underperform those without politically connected CEOs by almost 18% based on three-year post-IPO stock returns and have poorer three-year post-IPO earnings growth, sales growth, and change in returns on sales. The negative effect of the CEO's political ties also show up in the first-day stock return. Finally, firms led by politically connected CEOs are more likely to appoint other bureaucrats to the board of directors rather than directors with relevant professional backgrounds.
● Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China
Joseph D. Piotroski 斯坦福大学工商管理研究生院
This paper shows that incentives created by the impending turnover of local politicians can accelerate the pace of initial public offering (IPO) activity in certain politicized environments. Focusing on China, we exploit a research setting where politicians are rewarded for capital market development, firms rely on political connections for access to capital, rent-seeking behavior is rampant, and the objectives of the state might not be to maximize capital market efficiency. We find that the rate of exchange eligible firms engaging in an IPO temporarily increases in advance of impending political promotion events. This effect holds for both state-owned and non-state-owned entities. For state-owned firms, the effect is strongest in those provinces where the politicians are more likely to be rewarded for market development activity. For non-state-owned firms, the temporary increase in IPO activity appears to be (rationally) opportunistic in nature, with the effect stronger around events more likely to disrupt the firms' political connections. Promotion period IPOs underperform non-promotion period IPOs in terms of both future financial performance and long-run stock returns, have controlling shareholders who retain a larger fraction of the company, and are more likely to divert proceeds away from their intended use after the offering.
●Profiting from government stakes in a command economy: Evidence from Chinese asset sales
Charles W. Calomiris 哥伦比亚大学商学院
Raymond Fisman 波士顿大学
We examine the market response to an unexpected announcement of the sale of government-owned shares in China. In contrast to earlier work, we find a negative effect of government ownership on returns at the announcement date and a symmetric positive effect from the policy's cancellation. We suggest that this results from the absence of a Chinese political transition to accompany economic reforms, so that the benefits of political ties outweigh the efficiency costs of government shareholdings. Companies managed by former government officials have positive abnormal returns, suggesting that personal ties can substitute for government ownership as a source of connections.